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Abstract
By way of presenting an ahistorical fictitious story, this paper is ment to
illustrate that:
￿ in contrast to conventional wisdom, trade unions, in their symbiosis
with capitalist firms, may further rather than impede price-mediated
self-regulation in the labour market via their involvement in wage-
setting,
￿ whereas producer co-operatives, although they might seem to
represent a close collateral of fully unionized capitalist firms, are
fundamentally at variance with the logic of market self-regulation,
in that they tend to respond to an increase in demand by restraining
rather than extending supply,
￿ with the consequence that they cannot even in principle be an
alternative to capitalist firms, at least on a mass scale, unless
combined with the adoption of some kind of bureaucratic price
control.BUDAPESTI
CORVINUS
EGYETEM
MAGYAR TUDOM`NYOS AKAD￿MIA
K￿ZGAZDAS`GTUDOM`NYI INT￿ZET
G`BOR R. ISTV`N
TŐK￿S V`LLALAT VIS-￿-VIS SZAKSZERVEZET
￿ KONTRA TERMELŐSZ￿VETKEZET
PERIPATETIKUS TANMESE AZ INTÉZMÉNYI RACIONALITÁS/DIVERZITÁS
ÉS A PIACI ÖNSZABÁLYOZÁS ELLENTMONDÁSOS VISZONYÁRÓL
Összefoglaló
A tanulmÆny t￿rtØnelmietlen tanmese, amely azt igyekszik szemlØltetni,
hogy:
–  m￿g a tőkØs vÆllalkozÆssal val￿ szimbi￿zisÆban a szakszervezet ￿ az
uralkod￿ szakmai k￿zfelfogÆssal ellentØtben ￿ alapvetően az Ærsza-
bÆlyoz￿ piac műk￿dØsi logikÆjÆba illeszkedő intØzmØny,
–  addig a tőkØs vÆllalkozÆs Øs a szakszervezet funkci￿it egyazon szer-
vezetben egyes￿tő termelősz￿vetkezet, lØvØn a termØkkereslet n￿ve-
kedØsØre k￿nÆlatszűk￿tØssel reagÆl￿ intØzmØny, sz￿ges ellentØtben Æll
az ÆrszabÆlyoz￿ piac műk￿dØsi logikÆjÆval,
–  amiből k￿vetkezően a szakszervezeti bØrkontroll mellett műk￿dő tő-
kØs vÆllalkozÆsnak elvileg is csak valamifØle b￿rokratikus Ærkontroll
mellett lehetne t￿megmØretekben intØzmØnyi alternat￿vÆja.Imagine that we each own and manage a small firm in an imaginary
capitalist country of an imaginary world, where trade unions are as yet non-
existent. As is shown by the first two entries in the raw of italicized figures
of the attached table, each of our firms is employing 10 workers, and pays
them 100 thousand „dumps” (designated as Ð from now on) a month, the
going rate of pay in their labour market. Assume that everyone who wants
to be employed in this labour market for that pay has a job, and that there
are thousands of firms in our industry, all alike, producing one and the
same kind of product.
More specifically, we all employ identical workers and an identical
technology, in which workers and physical capital are imperfect substitutes.
Each of us produces 205 units of product a month, by the optimum (i.e.,
unit-cost minimizing) combination of labour and physical capital given the
rate of compensation and the price of capital, at Ð650,000 fixed costs a
month. (A cut-back by, say, Ð50,000 on these fixed costs at any firm
should be offset by the employment of one more worker, and a cut-back on
employment by one worker should be offset by expending Ð150,000 a
month more on fixed costs, so that output be kept constant, with the
obvious result of Ð50,000 net rise in monthly total costs at the given level
of production in either case.)
We all sell our product for Ð10,000 a piece, which is the current market
price of this product. (More precisely, for Ð12,000, but since the yet
unmentioned costs of production – material, energy, etc. – are directly
proportional to production, and amount to Ð2,000 per product at any level
of production, we can – and will – make our calculation simpler by
subtracting these variable costs from both the selling price and the unit cost
of our product.) We thus obtain [205×10-(10×100+650] ×1000= Ð400,000
monthly profit. Of this Ð400,000, we regard Ð350,000 as a fair
compensation for our entrepreneurial/managerial effort, and the remaining
Ð50,000 as a fair return to our capital investment. As a matter of fact, those
from among our competitors who bought the physical capital of their firms
on credit must each bear this amount of monthly cost on interest as
additional fixed cost, and those who rent theirs are charged Ð700,000 per
month for its use, i.e. Ð50,000 more than our fixed costs.
Given that, by employing 10 workers, each of our firms produces 205
products a month, how many products could they each produce by
employing 11 workers?4
Should we pose this question to our upper-grade elementary school kid,
who is familiar with the mathematical rule of proportions but ignorant of
the economic law of diminishing return, we should expect to get the answer
(205÷10)×11=225.5. We as experienced entrepreneurs, however, are aware
of the saddening fact that increases in employment would not yield us
proportionate increases in production, for at least two reasons. First, hiring
additional workers would reduce the amount of physical capital per worker
and, second, the larger the number of workers we employ the less effective
our supervision would be, with both factors acting to worsen labour
productivity. Without knowing the rate of decline in productivity that
would accompany employment growth at our firms it is impossible to give
an unambiguous answer to our question.
Be the right answer to our question this: If by employing 10 workers we
now produce 205 products a month, then by employing an 11th we could
produce (instead of 20.5 more units, as would follow from the rule of
proportions) only 15 more units, that is, 220 products.
The way we arrived at this specific number can be traced from consecutive
entries in column (3) – or, equivalently, in column (4) – of our table.
Namely, should we employ only one worker she could produce 25 products
per month (see the top entry in column (4) or column (3)); by employing
two we could produce 24 more units, i.e. 49 units (see the next entries in
columns (4) and (3), respectively); by employing three workers we could
produce 23 more units, i.e. 72 units (see the third entries in the said
columns); and so on. It then follows that our ten workers must indeed
produce 205 products – 16 more than nine could –, and that eleven workers
would produce yet 15 more; this is how we arrived at 220 products above
as the right answer to our question. And it can be easily figured out that
twelve workers would produce 220+14=234 products, thirteen would
produce 234+13=247, and so on. (Up to 325 products, which could be
produced by a workforce of 25 workers. As a result of the high degree of
tumult in the workplace, the employment of a 26th worker would add
nothing to our firm’s production, while hiring a 27th one would even cause
a decline in our monthly production, which means that we could not gain
from hiring her even if she did not claim any compensation for her labour
services.)
And now the next question:
Given the going, Ð100,000 monthly compensation, would it not be worth
the while for us to hire an 11th worker?5
The obvious answer is that, yes, it would. As was just shown, our
production would thus increase by 15 units a month, yielding 15×10,000=
Ð150,000 additional revenue –Ð50,000 in excess of the Ð100,000
additional labour cost that we should bear. To wit, we could register
Ð50,000 increase in our monthly profit.
In fact, it would pay us to extend employment even further, as far as 15
workers. Indeed, the employment of a 15th worker would add 11×10,000=
Ð110,000 to our monthly revenue, and would thus augment by 110,000-
100,000= Ð10,000 (and the employment of the 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th and
15th workers together by 50+40+30+20+10= Ð150,000) our monthly profit.
Let us disregard for a moment that the going rate of compensation is
Ð100,000 a month, and rephrase our latter question this way:
Would it also be profitable to strenghten our workforce if the going rate of
compensation were somewhat higher ￿ say, Ð115,000 a month?
The answer is again quite obvious. Provided that, in spite of the lower rate
of profit that this higher rate of workers’ compensation implies, we find
that we had better stay in business (because, say, we insist on our
entrepreneurial autonomy, and/or because this more modest profit is still
higher than what we could expect to get as a wage labourer plus from
property income), even at this Ð115,000 rate of workers’ compensation it
would pay us to hire four more workers. To be sure, even the employment
of a 14th worker would increase our monthly revenue by 12×10,000=
Ð120,000, i.e., Ð5,000 more than the amount it would add to our monthly
wage bill.
Similarly, even at a rate of workers’ compensation as high as Ð145,000 a
month we could increase our (then of course still lower) profit by extending
employment from 10 to 11, since the employment of a 11th worker is
supposed to increase our monthly revenue by more than Ð145,000, namely,
by 15×10,000= Ð150,000.
How could we then justify the initial scene of our tale in which every firm
in the industry, including ours, was assumed to employ only 10 workers
each?
Labour shortage may seem to be a potential explanation: as was noted at
the outset, everyone who wants to be employed in this labour market at the
going rate of compensation is already employed. True, but we have just
seen that it would pay each of us to hire additional workers even at rates of
compensation that are higher than the current rate – why do we not lure6
away workers from our competitors by offering more generous
compensation?
It could be argued that should we all do so, the resulting higher market
wage would certainly produce an inflow of workers into this labour market,
but perhaps not a sufficiently large one so that each of us could hire even
one additional employee, while we should all suffer from the profit-
reducing effect of the higher market wage. Or, if each one of us could hire
one additional employee from the enlarged pool, then the several thousand
times 15 additional products that would be supplied to the market should
bring forth a fall in the market price of our product, and, again, we may all
end up with lower profit.
Yet, these arguments are flawed in that they are based on the seemingly
artificial assumption that several thousand competing firms act in concert
in the labour market, as dictated by their collective group interest, instead
of each pursuing its individual self-interest.
But if not our (voluntary or forced) complience to the norm of collective
group rationality, what else prevents us from entering into wage
competition with each other, as a result of which labour shortage in this
market would eventually be eliminated? Why none of us breaks the ice by
posting a wage offer which is above the current market wage?
Assume that at least Ð5,000 a month additional compensation (above the
current Ð100,000) is needed so that any one of us could attract at least one
additional applicant – say, because for less no potential applicant would be
willing to bear the psychic costs of moving to a new place of employment.
But if that much is payed to the newly hired we can hardly deny her co-
workers, whom we hired before, a similar pay rise. Should we try, some of
them would respond by leaving our firms – either because they would see
in our apparently discriminatory waging practice an insult, or would simply
find it annoying to work for less than someone else around gets for the
same job. As a result, we could even suffer a net loss of our workforce to
our competitors, despite new hirings. We should, moreover, expect a
deterioration in work moral among those of our employees who stay put.
True but, as we realized before, it would be worth it to hire new workers
even if our workers should be payed uniformly Ð105,000 a month. The
question thus arises:
Why should not we hire an 11
th worker for Ð105,000 a month and simulta-
neously raise the compensation of the rest of our workers to this level as
well?7
The obvious reason is that in this case the hiring of an 11th worker would
cost us (105+10×5)×1000= Ð155,000 a month, as against Ð150,000 that it
would add to our revenue. That is, instead of making additional profit, we
would deprive ourselves of Ð5,000 prospective monthly profit. And we
cannot know it for sure whether or not this loss of profit would be offset by
the performance-enhancing effect of our workers’ temporarily above-the-
market level of compensation. This is how we – as well as our competitors
– may come, without any respect for collective group interest, to the
conclusion that it is wiser not to break the ice. Which, in turn, implies that
the market may in this case throw up its invisible hands in dispair: although
each one of us would want to increase employment – that is, there exists a
substantial amount of excess demand for labour in this market –,
spontaneous market forces may fail to generate an upward adjustment in
the current market rate of workers’ compensation.
And how would we respond in this case if one morning we were noticed by
our workers that they have become unionized and they urge us to raise
their monthly compensation from Ð100,000 to Ð105,000, or else they
would go on strike?
At first, perhaps, we would be angered by the prospect of the loss of profit
that we should suffer if we meet our workers’ wage demand, and conclude
that we should resist. Why on earth shall we pay our workers more than
what they could earn elsewhere, i.e., more than our fellow-enterpreneurs
pay their workers? Still and all, after due consideration, we should choose
to surrender – why?
Of course not because we are tortured by remorse at exploiting our
workers, and want to unburden our conscience by surrendering. True, as
was pointed out above, as long as the going market rate of compensation is
Ð100,000, none of us will hire an 11th worker for Ð105,000 unless it
results in at least marginally more than Ð155,000 additional revenue,
which implies quite a high (close to 50%) rate of exploitation. But we can
easily compromise with our conscience by reminding ourselves that the
surplus from exploitation will in this case finance a rise in the monthly pay
of our existing ten workers.
Instead, we would (unwillingly) meet the union’s wage-demand from sheer
opportunism. Namely, we must take it into accont that since our workers
can easily find jobs that pay Ð100,000 a month elsewhere, they could
hardly be deterred by a threat of dismissal. Should we still resist, some of
them may quit voluntarily as a revenge for our tight-fistedness, and – as
was also pointed out above – we should offer at least Ð105,000 monthly8
compensation to find replacement anyway. And we cannot gain by carrying
out a threat of dismissal either, for the same reason.
Recall that at any rate of monthly compensation between Ð100,000 and
(less than) Ð110,000 we could maximize our profit by hiring five new
workers. Now that the monthly rate of compensation in our firm has risen
to Ð105,000 it is long odds that we will indeed soon find at least one to
hire. Retrospectively, we ought to bless the hour when we tempered our
anger, and did not respond to our workers’ collective wage-claim by
threatening them with dismissal, since by hiring an 11th worker we should
now risk our credibility.
Soon it will be talked about all over the place that we pay our workers more
generously than our competitors pay theirs, and having understood that,
new applicants will drop in. To the extent that some of them are hired, it
will also become known that the higher price of labour that the union
imposed upon our firm has not backfired, in the form of job loss – on the
contrary: new hires have resulted. More and more workers elsewhere will
thus feel encouraged to organize, and/or will be granted a pay rise by their
employers, anxious to preserve their attractive force in the labour market,
even lack of local union pressure. That is, a growing part of firms and
workers in our industry may experience a simultaneous increase in wages
and employment.
With the higher rate of compensation becoming more and more wide-
spread in the market, our workers may one day come forward with a more
ambitious wage-claim, setting in motion another industry-wide wave of
wage growth and – as long as more workers are induced to enter the market
– simultaneous employment growth thereby, and so on. Sooner or later,
however, wages will exceed their equilibrium level, and employment will
fall. (To be sure, a rate of compensation above Ð160,000 a month, even
when combined with the current, Ð10,000 market price of our product,
would induce all firms in our industry to shed part of their workforce – as
can be easily checked by consulting with column (9) of our table –, and,
with expanding production, the market price of our product must fall.)
Falling employment will then simultaneously discipline unions’ excessive
wage-claims and increase employers’ resistance against such claims. If that
is the case, unions’ visible hands, although (not unlike unvisible hands of
efficient markets) with the eventuality of overshooting, serve as means of
pushing an otherwise upwardly inflexible rate of compensation towards,
rather than above, the equilibrium level.
*9
Let us interrupt our tale at this point, and ask the following question:
How typical is the above view on unions￿ wage and employment effects
among labour economists, and to what extent does it conform to reality?
Curiously enough, most labour economists would perhaps flout this view,
and would rather favour one or more of the following alternative views,
even though those alternative views seemingly run counter to both common
sense and factual evidence in several respects.
View 1 ￿ In the most simple and most favoured view, trade unions as
monopolistic organisations ready to forego jobs for wage gain use their
monopolistic power to push wages above equilibrium levels, and, given
that the quantity demanded of labour is negatively related to the price of
labour, they thus tend to reduce employment.
View 2 ￿ In a more refined view, unions also serve as means of workers’
collective voice, and in their latter capacity they may be instrumental in
improving labour productivity – through, e.g., reducing dissatisfaction-
induced labour turnover. Higher productivity may in turn partly offset
the employment-reducing effect of union wage gains.
View 3 ￿ Beside their productivity-enhancing potential, a further factor that
may curb unions’ employment-reducing effect is pointed out by
advocates of so-called efficient contract models, where negotiations
between unions and employers are assumed to be over Pareto-efficient
wage/employment combinations. In this setting, off-the-demand-curve
wage/employment combinations, representing pairs of higher-than-
competitive levels of wages and higher-than-competitive levels of
employment, can result as Nash-equilibrium outcomes.
In what respects are the above views contradictory to reason and at odds
with experience?
Objection 1 ￿ Note that both view 1 and view 3 take competitive outcomes
as points of reference in evaluating unions’ wage and employment
effects. Now, if labour markets were indeed competitive in the absence
of trade unions then it is hard to give economically sensible reasons for
why anti-monopoly legislation must turn a blind eye to the exercise of
unions’ monopolistic power. If, on the other hand, labour markets were
not competitive in the absence of unions, then it is hard to give reasons
for why one should take competitive outcomes as points of reference
when evaluating unions’ impacts.
Objection 2 – No less controversial is the assumption, shared by (and
crucial in) all three views, that unions willingly trade off employment10
opportunities for wage gains. It is based on a false syllogism: to the
extent that unions are conceived as monopolistic sellers of labour, they
must find it in their interest to sell less if they can thus charge higher-
enough prices – just like monopolistic firms will. It is false because, in
contrast to monopolistic firms, what unions sell – their members’ labour
power – is owned by their members as principals, who pay a fee for this
service. To assume that unions as agents are ready to make such trade-
offs is logically equivalent to assuming that they eagerly betray part of
their principals for the sake of the rest of their principals at any time –
quite a strange creed for a trade union to adopt (or to attribute to trade
unions). Should they adopt that creed, they could hardly find principals
(members) to betray.
Objection 3 – For a labour market to be competitive, it is essential that
employees (unlike workers in our tale) could costlessly change
employer. Now, to the extent it is indeed costless for them to change
employer, unions can hardly hope to assume and exercise monopolistic
power vis-à-vis employers, and achieve wage gains for their members,
in the presence of non-unionized workers competing for scarce
employment opportunities – except at high rates of unionization. Under
the condition of costless mobility, however, high rates of unionization
are hardly attainable.
Objection 4 – Objection 3 tacitly assumes that employers can costlessly
replace current employees by newly hired ones, which is a further
condition for a labour market to be competitive anyway. The contrary
assumption – i.e., that labour turnover is costly for employers – would,
on the other hand, mean that even without unionization workers possess
monopoly power vis-à-vis their employers, which would endow
Objection 1 with particular relevance.
Objection 5 – Our table suggests that should we cut down on our workforce
from the current ten to, say, nine or eight workers, we could register an
increase in our labour productivity (monthly production per employee)
from the current 20.5 to 21.0 or 21.5, respectively. (Should we retrench
our workforce in view of an external rise in the rate of workers’
compensation, bigger increases in labour productivity should result,
provided that we substitute physical capital for part of the now relatively
more expensive labour.) Granting this, View 1, which attributes
employment-reducing effects to unions, does not abide the crucial
empirical test that unions should exhibit productivity-enhancing effects
as well.11
Objection 6 – To the extent that unions do reduce workers’ voluntary quits,
as is assumed in View 2, they may do so partly by making quits
relatively more costly an option. If this is the case, then, in terms of
Objections 1 and 3, an evaluation of unions’ wage and employment
effects that takes competitive outcomes as points of reference is flawed
even if labour markets were competitive in the absence of unions.
Besides, it is controversial whether it is indeed the presence of unions
that explains lower rates of quits – as View 2 suggests –, or causality
runs the other way, i.e., higher costs of changing employment encourage
unionization – as is suggested by our tale. Recall that in the final
analysis it was these costs that enabled workers in our tale to achieve
simultaneous wage and employment growth via unionization. No less
important, it is far from clear in View 2 why the role unions are claimed
to play in enhancing productivity is not, instead, played by employer-
initiated forms of workers’ participation in decision-making.
Objection 7 – Finally, as for View 3, to assume that collective bargaining is
not confined to bargaining over wage rates but is widened to include
bargaining over employment as well, and to demonstrate that in such
setting collective bargaining may result in simultaneous wage and
employment gains, this course of reasoning is seemingly  artificial, for it
leaves information asymmetries inherent in union-employer
relationships out of consideration. To wit, in a setting where bargaining
is confined to bargaining over wage rates, as is assumed in right-to-
manage models of collective bargaining in Views 1 and 2, risk-averse
employers will not initiate a renegotiation of the agreed wage rates on
account of an unexpected bad turn of events unless, in case the initiation
is rejected, they are ready to prove by dismissals that events have, in
fact, taken a bad turn. Moral hazard on the part of employers, falsely
accusing contingencies as cause for renegotiation, is thus automatically
mitigated. By contrast, in a setting where bargaining is widened to
include employment as well, as is assumed in efficient-contract models,
even risk-averse employers are always tempted to initiate renegotiation,
since with an efficient contract obligating them to employ redundant
workers, they can always gain from dismissals. This latter setting is thus
hardly more than a fiction, although an instructive one for thought
experiments.
*
Recall that, prior to the above detour, trade unions in our tale, in their
symbiosis with our capitalist firms, served as visible hands acting to push
an otherwise upwardly inflexible rate of compensation towards, rather than12
above, the equilibrium level, although (not unlike unvisible hands of
efficient markets) with the eventuality of overshooting. Let us now resume
the tale by putting the clock as far back as the day when we are noticed by
our ten workers that they have formed a union, and they demand higher
wages.
What would we do if, instead of presenting us an ultimatum, they present us
a choice of either granting them Ð5,000 immediate pay rise, or they will
become their own masters: what they now do for us, as our employees, will
do for themselves, as working members of a producer co-operative that
they are ready to establish.
We are offered a deal of selling them our firm’s physical capital, which
they would pay for either from credit or in installments, or of renting it to
them if we prefer, and of our managing their cooperative firm for Ð350,000
monthly compensation, i.e., for the same amount of pay that we now earn.
Also, they let us know that they would form their co-operative together
with four more fellow-workers, who are now employed at other firms, for
they have figured out – in accord with entries in column (14) of our table –
that it is at this size of membership where average income per member
would peak, and reach Ð110,000 a month. Yet, they are confident that they
would in fact earn 10 percent more than that, i.e., Ð121,000 a month, for
they believe that under conditions of a co-operative it would pay them to
keep up a stiffer pace of work.
Although we find nothing objectionable in either their argumentation or the
proposed managerial compensation (let alone the invitation itself), had they
made their offer yesterday or before, we might have turned it down. Were
cooperative firm just as viable an organizational form as capitalist firm,
why would the latter have become so predominant all over the world? But
we are now under the influence of today’s news that one of our competitors
was noticed this morning that his workers had formed a union, and he now
has no other choice but to raise his workers’ monthly compensation from
Ð100,000 to Ð105,000. And he should be glad if he can soon find an
additional employee at this new rate of compensation, and end up with
Ð5,000 a month modest damage. (Compare 400 in column (10) to 395 right
below it.) Unlike our unlucky fellow-entrepreneur, a salaried manager of a
cooperative firm need not be afraid of sudden falls in remuneration for his
managerial efforts, due to union wage-claims. So, we answer in the
affirmative, and suppress our misgivings concerning the viability of
cooperative enterprise by attributing its subordinate economic position to
the difficulties producer co-operatives face in financing entry into more
capital-intensive, core industries.13
Under our leadership the co-operative has been functioning smoothly, with
the founding 14 working members and with the projected results, for
several months. We may thank our stars we took the opportunity and
converted from firm owner into salaried manager. The more so since
during these months spreading unionization has brought in its train huge
losses of profits to those who still own their firms.
Too good to be true: thanks to a sudden increase in market demand, the
price of our product has risen from Ð10,000 to as high as Ð12,000 this
morning, and we have reasons to believe that this increase in demand will
not be transient. True, it does not have an immediate impact on our
managerial compensation, for we are employed at a fixed salary.
Nevertheless, we look to our cooperative members to cast us a bone. After
all, with this 20 percent increase in the market price of our product, the
average income of our members will go up by significantly more than 20
percent: from Ð110,000 a month to Ð147,000 – compare corresponding
figures in columns (14) and (15). (Or, from Ð121,000 to Ð161,700 if they
indeed work so much more effectively as cooperative members as they
initially calculated.)
More importantly perhaps, our instinct guides us to respond to the higher
market price by admitting new members – a capitalist owner would surely
respond to this new market price by strengthening his firm’s workforce.
(Pairwise comparisons of corresponding figures in columns (9) and (12)
will make it clear that profit-maximization would indeed dictate him to
employ more workers at the new market price at any wage rate – at
Ð120,000, for instance, to employ 15 workers instead of 13.) And our
salary was agreed upon on the premise of a fixed membership.
Provided that the unit price of our product remains Ð12,000, what are the
odds that we will sooner or later succed in exacting a pay rise in return to
managing an enlarged membership?
Let us not build castles in the air: as a result of the new, higher market
price, the optimum size of membership, at which income per member is
maximized, is now smaller, not larger, for our co-operative firm than it
used to be – namely: 13, instead of 14 working members. (Compare the
positions of the highest, bold-type figures in columns (14) and (15).)
Consequently, instead of looking forward to an enlarged membership, we
had better be prepared to an erosion of membership – and realize that,
surrounded with capitalist firms, which do normally respond to a price rise
by expanding employment, we should lose in market share even with an
unchanged membership.14
Facing this prospect, we may now wonder whether we backed the wrong
horse when, for fear of unions, we suppressed our bad forebodings
concerning the viability of cooperative business entreprise, and exchanged
our position of the owner/manager of a capitalist firm for that of a salaried
manager at a cooperative firm.
*
Our ahistorical scholastic tale concludes here. It shows the moral that:
–  trade unions, in their symbiosis with capitalist firms, may further rather
than distort price-mediated self-regulation in the labour market via their
involvement in wage-setting,
–  whereas producer co-operatives, although they might seem to represent
a close collateral of a fully unionized capitalist firm, are fundamentally
at variance with the logic of market self-regulation, in that they tend to
respond to an increase in demand by restraining supply,
–  with the consequence that they cannot even in principle be an alternative
to unionized capitalist firms, at least on a mass scale, unless, perhaps,
combined with either the adoption of administrative price control or the
involvement of some kind of consumers’ „unions” in price-setting.
Yet, this contraposition is not meant to imply that trade unions are an
unmixed blessing, and producer co-operatives are limbs of the devil.
–  Unions of the kind that appear in our tale, i.e., ones that represent
workers of a firm or of a group of firms, also produce consequences that
clash with allocative efficiency – by, e.g., forcing employers to adopt
work rules and stuffing rules that interfere with cost minimization –, let
alone the inherent supply-restraining role of unionization along
occupational lines. There is no rose without thorn.
–  As for cooperative firms, they exemplify that, by contrast, every cloud
has a silver lining: it is exactly their „perverse” supply behaviour that
may make them, as representatives of a subordinate species, a useful
shock absorber in a market economy dominated by capitalist firms – let
alone their often-referred motivational advantages over their capitalist
counterparts.15
EPILOGUE
Those who are well-schooled in labour economics must have realized that
capitalist firms in our tale were portrayed as peculiar labour market
monopsonies, facing short-run labour supply curves that are horizontal at
the going wage rate for levels of employment equal to or below their
current levels, then jump up at these levels, and slope upward thereafter,
due to the (psychic or other) costs workers at the margin incur if they
change employment. With such monopsonistic capitalist employers on the
demand side, market forces may fail to generate an upward adjustment of
wages that could eliminate excess demand for labour.
Monopsony models of the labour market have a long history in the analysis
of the impacts of minimum wage legislations – see, e.g., Stigler [1946] as
an early example, and Card and Krueger [1995] as a relatively recent (and
hotly debated) one. Curiously enough, far less attention has been paid to
these models in the analysis of the impacts of union involvement in wage
setting. This is all the more surprising as there are well-elaborated models
to choose from – see particularly Burdett and Mortensen [1998], where
existence of employers’ monopsonistic power is derived from labour
market frictions – as well as anomalous empirical findings that call for their
adoption – see particularly unions’ ambiguous productivity effects found
by, e.g., Hirsch and Addison [1986] for the US or Metcalf [1988] for
Britain.
It is symptomatic that in Pencavel’s [1991] book on the labour market
impacts of trade unionism no mention is made of labour market
monopsony, and in Boal and Ransom’s [1997] paper on labour market
monopsony no mention is made of trade unionism. Even where union
involvement in wage setting is put into the context of monopsonized labour
markets,  like in, e.g., Fearn [1981] or Manning [2004], it is mostly done in
passing (in one single paragraph, on page 208, in Fearn’s book and also in
one paragraph, on page 155, in Manning’s paper).
Inverse supply (employment) response to higher product price as a
peculiarity of cooperative entreprise, which was also pinpointed in our tale,
is a long-established theoretical finding as well – see, e.g., Ward [1958]
and Domar [1966]. As a matter of curiosity, note that medieval craft guilds
are conceived in Gustafsson [1991] as early versions of co-operative
enterprise exhibiting this same peculiarity. In his interpretation, it was
primarily this peculiarity which necessitated the adoption of administrative
price control in medieval cities, and led to the historic defeat of craft guilds
with the advent of capitalist enterprise. To my knowledge, the relevant16
literature has not addressed the question of whether this same peculiarity of
co-operative enterprise might play a positive role in mitigating market
fluctuations in a full-blown capitalist market economy.
It is instructive to note that, inspired by empirical findings presented in
Addison and Siebert [1979], chapter 5, section 4 and Ben-Nem [1987], as
well as on theoretical grounds, Mikami [2003] comes to the conclusion that
conditions of monopsonistic local labour markets might be conducive to
the formation of producer co-operatives. This suggests that the formation of
unions and the formation of co-operatives may indeed be seen the way they
were seen in our tale: as alternative courses of collectively rational action
for workers facing with monopsonistic employers.
Due attention should be payed, however, to the paradox that collective
interests of members of a group will not necessarily move individual
members to act accordingly, as is well known since Olson [1965]. This pa-
radox implies that recognition of the possibility to achieve simultaneous
growth in wages and employment via unionization will not automatically
lead to high rates of unionization, particularly with gains from unionization
to be shared with non-members as well. Similarly, perception of the
prospective benefits of forming a co-operative does not guarantee that
individual workers will find it in their self-interest to do their share in
forming it, just as cooperative members’ collective interest in high work
moral will not necessarily translate into high on-the-job efforts. The
question of how pure self-interest may induce a significant part of workers
to willingly incur the costs of unionization rather than to free-ride is
addressed and given a hypothetical answer – one that starts from workers’
diverging interests rather than their common interest – in Myles [2001].
Questions of how far cooperative firm may induce its members to act in
their collective group interest, and of what aspects of cooperative and
capitalist firms – including problems of monitoring and incentives;
portfolio diversification by workers; workers’ wealth constraints and access
to credit; collective decision-making, etc. – may explain the predominance
of the latter form of business organization in today’s developed market
economies, are addressed in Nilsson [2001] and Dow and Putterman
[2000], respectively.17
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APPENDIX: FICTITIOUS FIRM-LEVEL DATA
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